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The complex system of knowledge economy and the quest of 
governance for stakeholders’ networks 
Modern firms are adapting to the dynamic and knowledge intensive conditions of globalised 
markets employing different organizational elements. The role of stakeholders and networks are 
shaping the boundaries of enterprises, and managerial literature is analyzing these changes 
trough the tools provided by transaction costs economics and resource-based theory (Morroni, 
2011; Aoki, 2010; Pitelis and Teece, 2009; Williamson, 1995). These approaches are considered 
particularly suitable for a context of complex knowledge interactions in conditions of 
uncertainty, because they allow for bargaining and contractual hazards. However, the radical 
changes of the last decades have not involved only the models of organization of the enterprises, 
but the entire production structure and the relation between firms and economic environment 
(Verbeke and Tung, 2012; Rullani, 2009; Rajan and Zingales, 2000; Nahapiet and Goshal, 
1997). Managerial literature is then developing an original analysis of the architecture of modern 
enterprises, looking at new key variables for a successful competition in the market (Crilly and 
Sloan, 2012; Harrison et al., 2010).  
In this research we try to use concepts and tools from complexity theory, systems dynamics and 
evolutionary economics for drawing a model of the knowledge network that constitutes the 
“social capital” of the firm, looking not at the quantity of connections (network’s dimension) but 
at their quality (network’s value) and dynamic development.  
In particular, we will investigate how (and when) firms collect and utilize information about a 
stakeholder’s utility function to create new sources of value, that takes to analyse also which 
kind of knowledge can be useful for each firm and what are the costs. 
Our analysis is aimed to evaluate the complex dynamics of firms’ interactions in an uncertain 
environment. We will attempt to outline, also by means of a formal approach, a model to assess 
the evolution of firms’ social capital toward value creation. In this paper we draw a “schema” to 
help understanding some complex strategic settings, analyzing if and how some network ties can 
create value or chaos, producing or dissipating resources.  
Fundamental changes in the model of the firm 
During the last twenty years, the traditional business corporation, emerged in the early 20th
century, has faced dramatic changes, concerning the internal organisation, the crucial assets and 
the productive structure1.
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For Chandler (1990), the primary advantage of the traditional model of corporation was its scale 
and scope: in the business reality the economies of scale of traditional industries, together with 
the mass advertising of their brands, have constituted strong barriers to the competition of new 
entrants, resulting in a limited competition in the final output markets (Rajan and Zingales, 
2000). In this context, the interests of the company are different with those of society. For 
society, the more competition, the better. But for individual companies, the objective of the 
strategy is to reduce the play of competition, to get as much as possible for themselves.  
Several industries, then, came to be dominated by a small number of vertically integrated giants, 
with few independent suppliers in intermediate markets. The very low competition in the 
intermediate markets led to several organizational consequences. Through its control of the 
firm’s assets, headquarters effectively controlled the main source of employment, giving to the 
top management an enormous power and an accumulation of organizational surplus in their 
hands (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). The different parts of the enterprise were managed trough 
an organizational hierarchy that was the sole programming engine of the company, in this way 
removing from middle managers the responsibility to define the meaning of what is being doing 
and to regenerate the reliability of relations with the rest of the world (Rullani, 2009). The search 
for satisfactory solutions should identify any replicable routine able to simplify the management 
and decision-making required by organizations: it addressed only the things that did not “work” 
(have performance below the minimum threshold permitted) and for the rest replicated what 
instead “works”. This was a knowledge “reproducible” trough protocols, thought to be replicable 
at no cost, rapidly and with high guarantees of success in many different contexts. This paradigm 
could be functional to large scale and mature industries, because it is totally impersonal and a-
contextual, as it makes irrelevant the individual participation and knowledge contribution. Many 
industries were then giving the power over important decisions to impersonal automatism, 
following internal logic of functional optimization and eventually creating a fast capitalism of 
replication, which initially appeared successful, but that has been in fact unable to reproduce its 
premises in the long run. The result has been a clear paradigm of value production that Rullani 
(2009), with an vivid expression, calls mechanistic/authoritarian. 
This last globalisation process we are living in has increased the demand for process innovation 
and quality improvement, raising a new global competition at the intermediate goods level with a 
consequent breakdown of the vertically integrated firm and the emerging of human capital as a 
crucial asset (Rajan and Zingales, 2001). This has made evident that “the firm is not anymore a 
well-bounded organisation” that we can “take for granted” (Zingales, 2000). Economic 
approaches based on market imperfections, namely the asymmetry of information and the 
problems coming from the principal-agent bargaining, derive directly from traditional models of 
firm. Some economists several years ago were already claiming that other patterns seems to be 
underexplored, “while the asymmetric information approach has reached the points of 
diminishing returns” (Harris and Raviv, 1991) about the capability of analyzing investment 
dynamics and value creation.  
However, economists still attempt to design models feasible for a relatively stable long-term 
growth towards an equilibrium: the so-called “endogenous growth” theories, emerged in the last 
decades, try to combine the neoclassical equilibrium analysis with the Schumpeterian tradition 
about innovation trough the crucial role of skilled labor. In fact, these theories give just some 
partial insights on firms’ growth processes, assuming that innovations are introduced smoothly in 
a market characterized by a monopolistic competition with a variety of products, drawing from 
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the same pool of generic knowledge, which is considered as an Arrovian public good (Romer, 
1990 and 1986; Aghion and Howitt, 1998)2. These models derive in fact from the neoclassical
view of the firm as a legal entity with a production set (a set of viable production plans) the 
knowledge of which is presumably common. From such a set a manager acts rationally with full 
information, choosing the one most likely to maximize profits or the present value of the firm. 
The “contractual view” of the firm, developed by Coase (1937), Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
Williamson (1985), relies on the notion of separation between ownership and control. This 
means that an entrepreneur, or a manager, raises funds from investors to put them to productive 
use, while financiers need the manager’s specialized human capital to generate returns on their 
funds. But financiers cannot be sure that their funds will not be expropriated or wasted on bad 
projects3. The concentration of power at the top of the organizational pyramid, together with the
separation between ownership and control, made the agency problem between top managers and 
shareholders the corporate governance problem (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Then, most of 
traditional financial literature has been devoted to analyze if (and how) credit and equity markets 
can be considered able to monitoring efficiently the firms (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990; Diamond, 
1991; Harris and Raviv, 1990; Hart and Moore, 1995; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993; Grossman 
and Hart, 1980 and Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).  
In fact, this analysis gives just some partial insights on firms’ growth processes. For the 
endogenous growth theories economic growth relies upon the collective access to generic 
knowledge, which flows in the air and retains the typical features of the Arrovian public good4.
The introduction of innovations takes place smoothly in a market characterized by a 
monopolistic competition with a variety of products, drawing from the same pool of generic 
knowledge (Romer, 1990 and 1994; Aghion and Howitt, 1998). The complementarities between 
research and learning by doing stressed by the endogenous growth theories can be 
accommodated in this framework, so looking at the way an increase in the productivity of 
learning by doing will generate higher rents, and how they are shared. The theoretical 
justification for this context was derived from a view of the firm where each party belonging to 
the “nexus of contracts” has contractual claims on the surplus with pre-determined payoffs 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). The exceptions are the shareholders, who accept a residual payoff 
because they have a comparative advantage in diversifying risk. In this context, the scholars of 
the new growth theory stressed the advantages of each system (debt or equity) arising from the 
relative effectiveness in spreading information about firm prospects and research activity in 
order to create technological spillovers and facilitate monitoring. But this financial side of the 
2
 Some economists (i.e. Zingales, Rajan and Zingales) propose this view of the firm based on human capital as 
foundation also for a model of finance, but using such contractual view of the firm centered on the highly skilled 
employees doesn’t provide convincing solutions for the dynamics of an enterprise facing a discontinuity (i.e. an 
innovating phase), always clashing at the end against the rationing of credit by financiers, caused by the uncertain 
perspective.  
3
 A vast managerialist literature explains how managers use their effective control rights to pursue projects that 
benefit them rather than investors (Baumol, 1959; Williamson, 1964; Jensen, 1986; Grossman and Hart, 1988). 
Managerial opportunism, whether in the form of expropriation of investors or of misallocation of company funds, 
reduces the amount of resources that investors are willing to put up ex ante to finance the firm (Williamson, 1985; 
Grossman and Hart, 1986). 
4
 The spillover of generic knowledge helps the generation of specific technological knowledge, which is embodied 
in new products and processes and it is highly idiosyncratic, so that can be appropriated without reducing the 
incentives to the generation of new knowledge. 
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models come directly from a traditional view of the firm5: the efforts to design a new
endogenous innovation process without undermining the traditional view of the firm, do not add 
new hints to the comprehension of the management of the various knowledge assets of the firm 
and their possible contribution to a growth path. In this view, maximization of shareholders’ 
value should necessarily lead to maximization of the value of the enterprise.  
Nevertheless, in a world of incomplete contracts and multiple sources of power, the contractual 
protection provided to the parties in the nexus of contracts is necessarily incomplete. There are 
many residual claimants, so to privilege the shareholders (or even worst, just the controlling 
shareholders) can take to serious distortions in the risk management of a company with possible 
consequences on the firms’ financial equilibriums. Eventually, maximization of shareholders’ 
value does not necessarily lead to maximization of enterprise value. 
In the next paragraphs, we will show that the role of knowledge and the interactions with the 
various subjects around the firm must be the core of the analysis for “understanding the 
connection between assets in place and growth opportunities” (Zingales, 2000), trough a more 
realistic and updated description of the mechanisms of the “black box”.  
New insights for new systems dynamics 
Evolutionary literature about innovation and resources6 permits to break the notion of localised
technological knowledge away from the sole contribution of human capital. Knowledge is linked 
to a larger definition of “production space” that considers the local characteristics in terms of 
productive history, factors endowment, relations between economic agents etc., such that it is not 
an exclusive patrimony of few specialized workers. Merging the resource-based approach with 
stakeholder management (Verbeke and Tung, 2012) emphasizes the importance of the social 
construction of a network of stakeholders as resource providers, who help the firm to compete 
successfully in the market. This is not just the technical processes of accumulating and 
combining resources with value-creating features, but it is the recognition that a firm’s 
stakeholder network can be in itself a source of competitive advantage (Harrison et al., 2010; 
Rullani, 2009).  
5
 Jensen and Meckling (1976), Ross (1977) and Harris and Raviv (1991) already argued that leverage-increasing 
issues are generally viewed as positive signals because debtholders seem to monitor investors more closely than 
shareholders and also because limited free cash flow reduces the possibility that managers pursue non profit rent- 
seeking activities. 
6
 On the side of the theory of the firm, theories has been developed about the co-evolution of technology, industry 
and market structure within an “evolutionary” context (Nelson and Winter, 1973,1974; Rosenberg, 1976), with 
“innovation systems” characterized at the level of a nation (Freeman, 1988; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993), an 
industry (Mowery and Nelson, 1999) or a technology (Carlsson, 1995) looking at the changes occurred in markets 
and at the effects of these changes on the production structure of modern companies, enhancing the fundamental 
contributions of Penrose (1959) and Chandler (1977) about learning and knowledge resources. 
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Figure 1: Foundations of the model 
Two new crucial features come out from this theoretical evolution: knowledge and network. 
These factors are central for understanding and evaluating the firm’s capabilities to innovate 
(Maturana and Varela, 1992). The firm is not anymore an impersonal nexus of contracts, but 
rather a selective and selected combination of complementary activities based upon the 
capability to accumulate competence and knowledge.  
A “systemic” view of the firm, assuming the variety of firms in terms of product and factor 
markets, explains how to create value trough the interaction and competition in the market place 
of agents, which are able, by means of systemic learning processes (learning by doing; learning 
by using; learning by consuming etc.), to accumulate technological knowledge and to generate 
and to adopt new technologies, in a continuous exchange with the economics systems where they 
are operating (Vicari and Cillo, 2006). This theoretical evolution has opened a new vision about 
the utilization by the firm of its resources, and about the relationship with the maximisation of 
the value: this change needs a new methodology to analyse these complex features.  
Literature on complexity shows that a system changes its behavior in relation to the diverse 
results obtained, because is not attached to a invariant model of conduct, but to a certain 
performance to be achieved, such that it gets different adaptations in different contexts. This 
relationship with the performance is not purely mechanical, but it is based on feedback, namely 
the capacity to correct the effects of actions when they do not guarantee the performance due. 
Feedback corrects, but if the system is quite flexible, it can also be a source of evolutionary 
learning: the system changes its behavior, its routines, its organizational structures, trying new 
combinations in all these fields. In addition, we sustain that this evolutionary learning is not 
based on “automatic” feedback, but it is the result of the ability and willingness of the various 
parties to continually regenerate the foundations of their relationship and their sharing: firm’s 
competitive advantage is the outcome of deliberate resources selection, access, accumulation, 
and recombination, based on systematic assessment and value-optimizing, managerial decisions 
in a context of resource mobility barriers (Crilly and Sloan, 2012; Ginsberg 1994; Zajac and 
Bazerman 1991).  
Resource-based theory
(firm-specific assets, 
competences, knowledge 
management to develop new 
unique resources) 
Evolutionary economics
(routines, dynamic capabilities, 
combination of competences)
Stakeholder management
(importance of stakeholder for 
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Interdependence and Consonance 
This strategy can take place because firms understood what benefits are linked to bind and to 
share. The decision to start the sharing process is accompanied by concepts of distributional, 
procedural, and interactional justice (Harrison et al., 2010), which regulate network ties based on 
identity, codes, measures and contracts that make the business relation reliable, so promoting 
mutual specialization. Goshal and Nahapiet (1998) have described this relationship between this 
“social” capital external to the enterprise and the internal human capital of the firm. The latter 
has skills and knowledge for developing appropriate and innovative practices designed to 
improve performance and survivability of firms in dynamic contexts. This can happen trough the 
combination of skills not previously linked, or through new ways to combine elements already 
connected, with an exchange of expertise which is either intrasystemic and intersystemic7.
In this research, we define social capital as the main way to develop the knowledge of the firm in 
consonance with the surrounding context. A consonance that represents “the implementation / 
maintenance of conditions of harmony, correspondence, alignment and dialogue between 
corporate values and the cultures and needs of the surrounding society” (Golinelli, 2008)8.
Eventually, the business models pluralize because in the network process of value creation there 
must be many and varied contributions (Morroni, 2011). When stakeholders are able to help with 
their behavior to reduce costs and increase the total utility produced, then competitiveness 
becomes an attribute that cannot be applied to individual firm, but must be reported to the chain 
or network affiliation. In this context we can assume knowledge as intrinsically indivisible but, 
at the same time, dispersed in a variety of individuals, no one of which can claim to control it 
entirely (Antonelli, 2003). Knowledge is then re-composed and directed to the creation of value 
when there is a “strategic focus” between the interacting subjects, whose objectives are closely 
tied and based on the same critical variables (Peirone, 2007). This is why the complementarity 
among the various agents in the network is central in the accumulation, generation and eventual 
valorization of knowledge. The firm can be considered the institution that is better able to 
manage such complementarities in a market economy (Miglietta and Peirone, 2009).  
We are able then to define the firm as a complex system, which survives in a competitive 
environment only trough an efficient combination of resources and energies that are taken from 
the environment itself, and given back to it with a higher quality (Golinelli, 2002; Miglietta and 
Peirone, 2009). Firms do more than adjust prices to quantities and vice versa: they are also able, 
via various learning processes (learning by doing; learning by using; learning by consuming 
etc.), to interact with the structure of the economic system, so that technologies and tastes at time 
t are the outcome of the strategic interaction in the market place of agents at time t
-1. The internal 
organization of firms is then now influenced by the need to implement the complementarities of 
the different pieces of knowledge possessed by, and accumulated in, the diverse units 
(Richardson, 1972). 
An organizational policy based on the valorisation of the owners’ securities on the market is not 
suited to the way value is produced in the global capitalism of knowledge, because knowledge is 
7
 Intrasystemic, concerns relations with the components of the operational structure of the firm; Intersystemic, 
concerns relations with entities of the systemic context of action. 
8
 This process is not happening just at the local level, because new technologies allow to have access to knowledge 
and relationships that are not circumscribed to a specific location, so increasing the possibility of evolutionary 
learning. 
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not a scarce resource. The power remains to the owners, but not always the threat of legal 
exclusion from a useful resource is effective for the practical purposes of governance. “Property 
today discovered itself weak and in need of further options and other methods of governance”(p. 
132 Rullani, 2009). Capital intensity is no longer a source of protection against competition. 
Innovations in ICT made communication costs to fall dramatically. Cross-border trade has 
expanded market size tremendously, and firms that were once oligopolists with the remarkable 
first mover advantage in their own small domestic markets, now fight it out in a larger, 
competitive, world market. These environmental trends got trough the firm’s paradigm we 
showed in the first part of this work, changing the nature of delegation in organizations and the 
ability of top management to exercise control. A recovered competition increases the pace of 
change, the need for new products and services, and consequently, for initiative and innovation. 
Employees have to be given more autonomy so that they can respond more quickly to change. 
Autonomy (and responsibility) may itself be a source of incentive.  
This ability to react rapidly to the changes in the economic environment cannot be based only on 
specialized human capital, but needs complex relationships for realizing and supporting 
collective actions developed in chains and networks. Only interdependence gives, in fact, the 
possibility to specialize remaining flexible, and realize great multipliers remaining compliant 
without a single standard.  
In search of a new model  
The new entrepreneurial paradigm based on knowledge, complexity and networks still appears to 
be vulnerable to criticisms. First, complex systems are fundamentally non-deterministic. 
However, “self-organization alone cannot explain the adaptation and differential survival of self-
organized systems” (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006) as it tells us nothing about assessment and 
selection. Here it comes the problem we are going to analyze in this paper: the governance 
mechanism of this complex system of knowledge interactions.  
The model will be then structured around three issues at three levels: selection process by the 
firm of the subjects to interact with, the governance at the network level, the dynamic path of 
these relationships in the general economic system. Let’s face them in turn. 
It is difficult to determine the boundary between a complex system and its environment, because 
openness (or non-isolation) is an inherent feature of complex systems (Martin and Sunley, 2007). 
However, boundaries are necessary to understand how the value created should be shared and 
which are the subjects entitled to be “rewarded”. Processes of sharing and networking are rather 
impermeable to formal economic incentives, because the various parties could hold on to their 
knowledge, to obtain a bargaining power to spend in the distribution of value chain, making their 
cognitive difference indispensable into the network relation (hold-up). It is the final result that 
actually gives value to the network, because the network itself is just a fact. Many analysis about 
networks seem instead to consider them as interesting objects of analysis “per se”, with no tie to 
any result or indicator of efficiency, making them completely exempt from an assessment.  
We look at the nodes of relationships which represent persons as more important than the 
relationships themselves: in this way the real governance problem in the complex systems of 
knowledge economy will be to take the different nodes of the network to behave in a manner 
consistent with the optimization of the total value produced by the available resources 
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(Verbeke and Tung, 2012; Capra, 1997). In our description, networks are social infrastructures 
enabling the complementarity of both nodes and links. This complementarity constitutes the 
reason for the establishment of networks and is therefore fundamental for their satisfactory 
functioning as infrastructure. In a network, nodes and links cannot be used at random, but need 
to be approached in a coordinated way in order to produce a specific service. We sustain the 
need of an approach based on what Potts (2000) calls an “ontology of connectivity”. As showed 
above, knowledge comes out from interactions, and it is the growth of knowledge that drives the 
process of economic evolution (Capra, 1997; Metcalfe, 1997; Foster and Metcalfe, 2004).  
In our view, the organization is more than just the sum of its parts and, in addition, it becomes 
intelligent system not only learning through feedback or using the intelligence technique which 
has access to (technology, software, algorithms, and the encoded information available), but also 
utilizing the fluid intelligence of people who, at various title, are linked to the enterprise: 
directly, as owners, managers and employees, or indirectly, as stakeholders with which the firm 
has established a relationship of mutuality and alignment.  
In an economic system that is both partially and generally in a state of connective flux, agents 
are heterogeneous, capable of learning (Arthur 1993; Potts, 2000) and are using internal models 
to process environmental signals into expectations. Production systems can be represented in a 
multi-agent simulation framework as schemata (Holland 1995, Epstein and Axtell 1996), which 
are sets of strings that operate as a kind of algorithmic suite. Networks are created as agents 
incorporate the expertise of selected other agents, such that the dynamics of expectations are the 
dynamics of a complex distributed network process.   
The model 
Connections, complementarities and expectations are the three main variables upon which our 
model is built. Connections are specific direct relationships between elements in the economic 
system: in the structure of interdependencies and interactions between agents, in technology, 
organisations and competence. They exist as contracts and in the structure of decision rules and 
the way that information is processed. Complementarities exist when various activities reinforce 
each other: performing multiple activities together lowers/(raises) cost, increases 
economies/(diseconomies) of scope, improves/(depresses) payoffs. Expectations and plans are 
interrelated constructs (they are both mental models), and each supposes the existence of the 
other. When the plans of individual agents are stable and widely known (or not), then it follows 
that expectations will also be stable (or not). When an agent is not able to form suitable 
expectations of other agents’ behaviours, then she will likely restrict her own planning horizon as 
a means of protection. This will feedback into the system of expectations engendering instability. 
Here it says the importance of governance.  
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Figure 2 Firm as a complex system: a model 
Trust is strongly needed for the stability of these linkages, but it is not the only factor. Aoki 
(2010) assumes trust as a pre-requisites of the exchange relation, which is represented as a game 
with expectations based on “reciprocity”, so arriving to a Nash equilibrium where agents do not 
want to change their choice. But from a rational perspective, simply trusting someone probably 
is not sufficient cause for one to divulge sensitive or private information. In addition, reciprocity 
does not mean fairness. In a situation of increased uncertainty, agents will tend to increase the 
interdependence of expectations (Potts, 2000). At the level of firm’s relations, network structure 
will show an increased density of feedback loops, eventually resulting in more chaotic dynamics. 
A formal way to represent this system is trough models of dynamic graphs that portray the 
structural-dynamic implications of variation in the density and distribution of connections.  
The appropriate framework for this type of analysis is the Random Boolean networks (RBNs) 
(Kauffman, 1969; Kauffman, 1993). In RBNs the nodes are generated randomly, without any 
assumption about particular functionality or connectivity. In RBNs the nodes are generated 
randomly, without any assumption about particular functionality or connectivity. Kauffman 
proposed the original RBN model, supporting the hypothesis that living organisms could be 
constructed from random elements, without the need of precisely programmed elements 
(Kauffman, 1969). Certain types of RBNs are very robust, and have many analogies to living 
organisms. A RBN consists of N nodes, which can take values of zero or one (Boolean). The 
state (zero or one) of each node is determined by K connections coming from other (or the same) 
nodes.  
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In RBNs, as well as in many dynamical systems, three macrostates can be distinguished:
complexity, and chaos. Each macrostate is a function of the density of connections in the system
(as k varies between 0 and n). Order is associated with low connectivity, chaos with high
connectivity and complexity is a narrow window of intermediate connectivity.
states of a network in a square lattice where the state of a node depends topologically on its
neighbours, and let the dynamics flow, we can easily see which states change, and which ones
are stable. In other words, we can observe how much 
change drastically the dynamics of a synchronous system, such as the prisoner’s dilemma
(Huberman and Glance, 1993), and it happens a similar thing for RBNs. 
Asynchronous RBNs (ARBNs), where a node is picked up at random, and updated, are
fundamentally non-deterministic. 
seemingly minor changes to the number of connections in the system can escalate with dramatic
effect as the system percolates from one macrostate into another.
market alone did not work well 
of knowledge economy cannot work only trough self
interactions, but the various connection happen because the involved human agents
common ground (the consonance
This is a useful approach if the specific structure and/or function of a system are very complex 
and unknown. Creation of value, in this case, can be obtained 
expectations”, where the strategic response
used by the other subject to build her
value for the active agent of the learning that takes place in the reactive agent as a result of th
experience of the interaction” (Perez
interaction, the reactive agent becomes less inter
that, although the first action was effective, there is no guarantee that subsequent actions will be.
Random Boolean Network: a set of
elements on a lattice with the state of each
element is specified by a Boolean logical
operation on a random set of k
elements (nk family of functions dependent
from the macrostates of the system (order,
complexity, and chaos)). 
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At the general level of the economic system, this process results in a endogenous governance 
mechanism guided by shared values. For the governance  process to be effective it is necessary 
that the agents’ behavior derives from a common ethic and must be leading to focus on substance 
over form. In corporate governance the linearity and predictability of behaviors allow to guide 
and control the action in companies thanks to the adoption of some formal models. However, this 
is not enough, are common and shared values  that can guide human action in a harmonious and 
substantial way, especially during periods of non-equilibrium.  
In this model the role of governance is then encouraging behavior based on shared values at a 
general level. 
So, the answer to the question raised by Coase (1937) about the necessity for the economy of the 
existence of an organization like the firm, is that the firm can be defined primarily a governance 
mechanisms for knowledge production and exchange. Survival depends on achieving unity, as 
the efficient complementarity of knowledge and values among the human agents inside the firm 
and between the various firms in the network. ‘‘Achieving optimal economic values is not an 
economic problem; it cannot be solved by manipulating economic variables alone. It depends on 
psychological and ethical variables. Only if these latter variables were fixed and could not be 
altered by learning processes (...) could the optimal economic value be achieved through purely 
economic processes’’ (Perez Lopez, 1987).  
The Endogenous Selection Process 
In our model, network structures of interaction will emerge, composed by the signals on her 
expertise that each agent is transmitting to others. Allowing agents’ different internal models, 
there will be diverse expectations irrespective of whether they have different input data or not 
(Crilly and Sloan, 2012).  When the plans of individual agents are stable and widely known (or 
not), it follows that expectations will also be stable (or not). 
When firms need to maintain control over their strategic assets there will be less interactions in 
the network. When firms need more independence and allow for knowledge heterogeneity, 
network interactions will increase.  
This model has an influence also on the relationship between markets and institutions (the 
concept of coherence as explained by Finger et al., 2005). The mainstream economic approach 
stress that introducing a competitive economic market structure and private sector oriented 
institutional regimes efficiencies and quality improvements will be obtained.  Liberalization is 
focused on institutional changes, such as unbundling, deregulation, privatization, public-private 
partnerships, asymmetric regulation, and other practices related to the market structure. This 
approach neglects the vital feature of networks seen above: the complementarity that defines the 
interrelations between the various nodes and links.  
We sustain that a consonance is needed also with the institutional architectures of the economic 
environment, assuring a coherence between the technical and the institutional coordination of the 
four major network functions determines the performance of infrastructures (e.g., 
interconnection, interoperability, capacity management, and system management), in terms of 
economic performance, public values and technical system integrity (Finger at al., 2005). The 
four major network functions are pivotal for enabling the functioning of infrastructures and 
creating value from the complementarities between the systems’ nodes and links. As an example, 
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the evolution of financial markets has demonstrated that the institutional characteristics of the 
market, intended to promote high competition among the players, have almost destroyed an 
essential infrastructure of the economic system, together with consumer confidence.  
Living systems are networks organizationally closed but open to the flows of energy and 
resources from the environment, and they are sustainable society as far as they are able to satisfy 
its needs without diminishing the chances of future generations (Capra, 1997). In nature, this 
happens trough the instinct that command not to dissipate forces and resources. In markets, the 
search for trust, complementarities and common grounds must become a common and shared 
responsibility by businesses. This is the way for the company to survival and to grow in modern 
competition,  therefore becoming in some ways “ethical”, not for obligation but for its own 
convenience. 
Concluding remarks 
In this paper we draw a model of value creation trough a “network of expectations”, allowing for 
heterogeneous agents with many different business models. The governance mechanism is based 
on Consonance among agents in the market and a Coherent structure of markets and institutions. 
This model shows that the impossibility to form suitable expectations of other agents’ behaviours 
takes to a restrictions of planning horizons as a means of protection. This will increase instability 
trough the interdependence of expectations. The increased density of feedback loops will result 
in a network structure with more chaotic dynamics. Consonance and coherence allow to exploit 
complementarities among the different knowledge resources.  
In our approach there is no “ethical” or “socially responsible” management rule, nor a definite 
benchmark, but an endogenous selection process that comes directly from the interaction inside 
the network, improving the quality and the efficacy of the relationships. It comes out that the 
core objective of management strategy is the creation of value, not the appropriation of value 
(Goshal and Moran, 2005).  
We also tried to understand how this value can be shared between firm and stakeholders 
avoiding resources’ dissipation. The model shows that achieving profits does not guarantee the 
organization’s survival or continuity. Survival is given by the ability to find new ways to collect 
and utilize information about stakeholders’ utility function, improving at the same time the 
capability (by means of feedback) of selecting which transaction partners are more and less 
likely to act opportunistically in the future. Our model portrays a deliberate resources selection, 
accumulation, and recombination trough a network of expectations based on coherence, targeted 
to optimize the total value produced by the available resources, regulated by dynamic feedbacks.  
The selection is linked to:  
1. the productive and organisational architecture,
2. the phase of development,
3. the need for the firm to control strategic resources or allowing knowledge heterogeneity.
This governance mechanism of the network gives to firms a crucial source of value in the global 
economy, that is the ability of their entire productive systems to react rapidly to external 
dynamics.  
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